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Abstract
Unlike Arrow￿ s result for process innovations, the gain from a product innovation can be larger
to a secure monopolist than to a rivalrous ￿rm that would face competition from independent
sellers of the old product. A monopolist incurs pro￿t diversion from its old good but may
gain more than a rivalrous ￿rm on the new good by coordinating the prices. In a Hotelling
framework, we ￿nd simple conditions for the monopolist￿ s gain to be larger. We explain why
the ranking of incentives di⁄ers under vertical product di⁄erentiation and suggest a principle
that may determine the ranking for additional demand systems.
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Does initial market power dilute a ￿rm￿ s incentive to invest in obtaining patentable innovations
because of a desire to protect existing pro￿t? In a seminal paper Arrow (1962) analyzed process
innovations that lower the cost of an existing product. He showed that a secure monopolist has
a weaker incentive to obtain a process innovation than would a competitive ￿rm facing the same
market demand. In the same environment we study product innovations. Our main contribution
is to show that Arrow￿ s ranking can be reversed ￿ the incentive for product innovation can be
stronger under secure monopoly.1 Compared to an entrant, a monopolist adding a new product
will divert pro￿t from its old product but may gain more on the new product by coordinating
the prices of both products. (These diversion and coordination e⁄ects are conceptually similar,
but not identical, to the literature￿ s ￿replacement￿and ￿e¢ ciency￿e⁄ects.)
We analyze nondrastic product innovations: the new good B is a di⁄erentiated substitute for
the initial good A and does not entirely displace it. We compare a ￿rm￿ s incentive to add product
B under three alternative regimes, with the ￿rm￿ s gain denoted in parentheses: secure Monopoly
(Gm) ￿ a monopolist controls product A and only that same ￿rm can add B; ex post Duopoly
(Gd) ￿ a monopolist controls product A but only a di⁄erent ￿rm can add B; and Competition
(Gc) ￿ product A is supplied by homogeneous Bertrand rivals (Arrow￿ s case), and any ￿rm can
add B. One motivation for these comparisons is that policy interventions can alter the market
structure and, hence, the innovation incentive, as under the following scenarios.
Regulation Scenario: compare Gm with Gd. Suppose there is a durable franchise monopolist in
A and the policy choice is between (i) granting that ￿rm also the monopoly rights over a competing
future product B, versus (ii) barring that ￿rm from B. Under regime (i), the incumbent is
unconcerned with preemption in B, so its gain from adding B is given by Gm; under regime (ii),
only an entrant can innovate in B, and its gain is given by its pro￿t under ex post duopoly, Gd.
Option (ii) may be motivated by a (correct) concern that the incumbent would price the new
product higher than would an entrant.
Merger Scenario: compare Gm with Gc. Suppose that producers of good A are initially
competitive, only they have the requisite assets to add product B, and they propose a merger-
to-monopoly in A. The gain from adding B is Gm if the merger is approved and Gc if the merger
is rejected.
1Observe that, like Arrow, we compare incentives under secure monopoly and under alternative market struc-
tures, not the incentives of a threatened monopolist to those of an entrant into the same market. It is well known
from the preemption literature (discussed in Section 2) that a threatened monopolist can have the greater incentive
to innovate. Policy motivations for taking secure rather than threatened monopoly as the relevant benchmark are
discussed shortly.
1Patent Scenario: compare Gm with Gc. Good A is supplied by a monopolist protected by
a patent, that also blocks innovation in B. If the patent is retained, the innovation incentive is
Gm; if it is voided, market A becomes competitive, and the innovation incentive changes to Gc.
Typically, Gc < Gd: the innovator￿ s pro￿t will be smaller if the substitute good A is supplied
competitively rather than by one ￿rm, since A￿ s price will be lower under competition. Our in-
terest is in comparing the incentives under these alternative market structures with the incentive
under monopoly. We represent product di⁄erentiation as horizontal, following the classic frame-
work of Hotelling (1929; see also Tirole 1988) but adapted to allow asymmetries: the products
can di⁄er in qualities ￿ their value to consumers before transport costs ￿ or, equivalently, in
their unit costs. We show that Gm > Gd if and only if the new product has higher quality than
the old, and that Gm > Gc always holds. Thus, the incentive for product innovation can be
larger under secure monopoly than under market structures that admit product market rivalry,
in contrast to Arrow￿ s ￿nding for process innovations.
To our knowledge, the only authors who have explored product innovation in a similar setting
are Greenstein and Ramey (1998) and Gilbert (2006, Appendix). Gilbert shows that Arrow￿ s
scale e⁄ect favoring a Bertrand competitor￿ s incentive to innovate relative to a monopolist￿ s can
be reversed if the initial competition is in di⁄erentiated rather than homogeneous products. In
Gilbert￿ s example the innovator discards the old product, which is dominated by the new one,
akin to a process innovation.2 Our interest is in cases where the products are imperfect substitutes
and a monopolist would sell both. The paper closest to ours is Greenstein and Ramey (1998).
They compare the same regimes (except that under duopoly they assume Cournot rather than
Bertrand competition), but they represent product di⁄erentiation as vertical (Shaked and Sutton
1983, Tirole 1988). Importantly, the ranking of incentives di⁄ers. They ￿nd Gm = Gc < Gd;3
whereas we ￿nd Gm > Gc, and even Gm > Gd is possible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. To place our contribution in context,
2Consumers are located on a Hotelling line, have unit demands, and the market is covered under monopoly
or competition, so normalize the constant total sales to 1. All consumers place an equal premium P on the new
product over the old (so the innovation is like a cost reduction). If a monopolist located at 0 innovates, it raises
price by P to the whole market so its gain is P. Now suppose that the innovating ￿rm located at 0 competes with
a rival at the other end. If the products were homogeneous (zero transport costs), the innovator would capture the
market with a trivial price cut and its gain would be P, as under monopoly; with di⁄erentiation, its gain is lower
because to capture the market would require an increase in margin smaller than P.
3The equality is shown in their Proposition 2(a), and the inequality in their Proposition 4(a). Commenting
on Proposition 2(a), they note that ￿by appropriately perturbing the utility functions ... either competition
or protected monopoly may provide strictly greater returns; thus equality should be interpreted to mean that
returns will be very close over a large range of demand conditions ...￿ Moreover, since duopoly yields strictly
higher innovation returns than competition and, therefore, than monopoly, a fair reading of their results is that
innovation incentives are weakly lower under protected monopoly than under product market rivalry.
2Section 2 starts with a brief synthesis of factors that a⁄ect innovation incentives under di⁄erent
market structures, distinguishing drastic from nondrastic innovation and our secure monopolist
case from a monopolist threatened by entry.4 Section 3 presents our basic model. Section 4
establishes our main result. In an asymmetric Hotelling framework, the incentive to add a new
product can be greatest under monopoly. In some such cases, overall welfare also is higher under
monopoly than under more competitive market structures. Of course, this observation should
not be construed as advocating monopoly, because monopoly has other well-known de￿ciencies;
it merely cautions against sweeping claims that product market monopoly invariably retards
innovation. Section 5 explains why our ranking of incentives under horizontal di⁄erentiation
di⁄ers from Greenstein and Ramey￿ s (1998) under vertical di⁄erentiation. The di⁄erent preference
patterns of the marginal consumers in the two settings enable a two-product monopolist to raise
the price of its old product and divert sales to the new without leaking sales to outside goods
under horizontal di⁄erentiation but not under vertical. Thus, horizontal di⁄erentiation magni￿es
the price coordination advantage to a monopolist innovator that also controls the old product.
Section 6 presents brief conclusions.
2 Innovation Incentives and Market Structure: a Brief Synthesis
Consider a process or product innovation that yields its owner a permanent monopoly over the
new technology. Our benchmark market structure is a secure monopoly: only the incumbent ￿rm
may deploy the new technology; if it does not, the status quo persists. Denote the monopolist￿ s
pro￿t stream without the innovation by ￿m
0 and with it by ￿m
1 (￿m
1 includes any pro￿t from the
old technology, which can remain valuable in the case of a product innovation). The monopolist￿ s
gain from the innovation, before acquisition costs, is Gm = ￿m
1 ￿ ￿m
0 . (This would also be
the incentive of a monopolist threatened by entry but acting myopically.) Next, consider two
alternative market structures where the innovating ￿rm initially earns zero pro￿t: it is either one
of several homogeneous Bertrand competitors with the old technology (Arrow￿ s scenario), or an
entrant facing an incumbent monopolist with the old technology. Post innovation, the ￿rm may
face rivalry from the old technology (￿may￿because the old technology could become not viable),
so denote its pro￿t by ￿r
1; and its incentive to innovate by Gr = ￿r
1￿0. The di⁄erence in incentives




the di⁄erence in pro￿ts with the innovation minus the di⁄erence without it.
The term (￿m
0 ￿ 0) has been called the ￿replacement e⁄ect￿(Tirole 1988): deploying a sub-
stitute new technology will reduce pro￿t from the old, and since a monopolist has higher initial
4For broader reviews see Gilbert (2006), Reinganum (1989), or Tirole (1988).
3pro￿t it has more to lose from innovating.5 This tells the whole story if the innovation is so
major that the old technology no longer a⁄ects the innovator￿ s pro￿t ￿ a drastic innovation. A
monopolist then has the smaller incentive since post innovation pro￿t will be the same regardless
of the initial market structure, ￿m
1 = ￿r
1.6
With a nondrastic innovation, however, ￿m
1 > ￿r
1: an innovator earns higher pro￿t when it
controls also the old technology than when it faces viable competition from that technology. The
di⁄erence in incentives, Gm ￿ Gr = (￿m
1 ￿ ￿r
1) ￿ (￿m
0 ￿ 0); now re￿ ects two opposing e⁄ects: a
secure monopolist earns more without the innovation than does a di⁄erently situated ￿rm, but
also earns more with the innovation.7 Despite this seeming ambiguity, Arrow was able to rank the
incentives for process innovations, but his argument cannot be applied to product innovations.
We revisit this key issue after contrasting the incentives of a secure and a threatened monopolist.
If a threatened monopolist fails to innovate, entry will occur deterministically or stochastically.
Gilbert and Newbery (1982), building on the preemptive investment literature (e.g., Eaton and
Lipsey 1979), show that an incumbent monopolist who can acquire the innovation will indeed
outbid an entrant if the innovation￿ s arrival date is known. The argument holds for a process or
product innovation and runs as follows. An entrant will acquire the innovation at date T unless
the incumbent has preempted. If the incumbent preempts, it controls both technologies and
earns the new monopoly pro￿t ￿m
1 . Instead, if entry occurs there will be asymmetric duopoly in
which the entrant uses the new technology and earns ￿d
1 (the analogue of ￿r
1), and the incumbent
uses the old technology and earns ￿d
0 instead of the old monopoly pro￿t ￿m
0 . The incumbent￿ s




0 ) + (￿m
0 ￿ ￿d
0). This exceeds
Gm, the gain to a secure monopolist, by (￿m
0 ￿ ￿d
0), because acquiring the innovation now has
the added bene￿t of foiling entry and preventing a drop in pro￿t.8
5The new technology replaces (and augments) the entire pro￿t from the old in the case of a process innovation,
since the innovator will abandon the old technology. For a product innovation, the new good may divert (￿replace￿ )
only some of the pro￿t from the old, as discussed in Section 2.
6In Arrow￿ s analysis, a process innovation is drastic if the new monopoly price is below the old marginal cost: the
innovator then prices as an unconstrained lower-cost monopolist whatever the pre-innovation structure. Whether





1 to be zero, the innovation must be drastic under each of the alternative structures (see Section 3).
7The analysis is unchanged when comparing a secure monopolist and an innovating ￿rm that initially is imper-
fectly competitive and earns positive (rather than zero) pro￿t ￿
r
0, provided none of its rivals can deploy the new













If other ￿rms also can innovate, then preexisting pro￿t creates an added motive for acquiring the innovation ￿ to
deny it to a competitor. Such preemption considerations will be discussed shortly.
8Recall that we assumed secure property rights for the innovator. Katz and Shapiro (1987) show that if imitation
is possible, a ￿rm may bene￿t if a rival innovates and a threatened monopolist could have a weaker incentive to
innovate than a secure monopolist. In his broad survey, Gilbert (2006) emphasizes that stronger product-market
competition can have opposite e⁄ects on innovation incentives when innovation property rights (legal or de facto)







1), industry pro￿t when a single ￿rm has a monopoly over both technologies minus industry




1), re￿ ecting the monopolist￿ s ability to coordinate industry output
or pricing.10 Tirole (1988) calls this post-innovation di⁄erence the ￿e¢ ciency e⁄ect￿ , where
e¢ ciency refers only to producer welfare. Thus, Gilbert and Newbery￿ s analysis implies that a
threatened monopolist will outbid an entrant for a nondrastic innovation when the innovation
process is deterministic.11;12
Our paper considers a secure rather than threatened monopolist. The ￿e¢ ciency e⁄ect￿
stressed in the preemption literature actually has a counterpart for a secure monopolist: with
the innovation it earns larger pro￿t than would a ￿rm that faced product-market rivalry, ￿m
1 >
￿r
1.13 This condition holds in Arrow￿ s setting for a nondrastic process innovation: the new
are weak rather than strong. If weak, an innovator￿ s return may come mainly from deploying the innovation itself
instead of licensing, so its gain may be larger when competition is weak (a possible basis for Schumpeter￿ s view
that monopoly power can encourage innovation).
9Salant (1984) observes that if exclusive licensing for a lump sum fee is feasible, the product market will remain
a monopoly regardless of who innovates, though he recognizes that antitrust constraints could prevent this. Gilbert
and Newbery (1984) note that transaction costs also could impede licensing. Gans and Stern (2000) adopt Salant￿ s
framework (and show how imitation ability and entry costs a⁄ect bargaining over the license fee and, hence,
innovation incentives). In contrast, Gallini and Winter (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1987) allow licensing (which
lowers industry costs) but not exclusive licensing to create monopoly, e.g., due to legal prohibitions (Gallini and
Winter, p. 242). We will assume that if the innovator is a ￿rm other than an initial monopolist, it will face
competition from the old product. In our model, licensing delivers no e¢ ciencies (the same new product is added
in all cases); and our comparison between secure monopoly and rivalrous market structures is motivated partly by
policy concerns with preserving price competition, concerns that naturally limit licensing-for-monopolization.





but it can generally do better by coordinating the choices of the two units. On the strategic limits of this mimicking
argument for the persistence of monopoly see Lewis (1983), Judd (1985), and Malueg and Schwartz (1991). Spulber
(2009) considers a di⁄erent departure from the mimicking principle by assuming that a ￿rm cannot supply both
products. An innovator can either license its technology to the incumbent or use it to produce a di⁄erentiated
product. When the product is su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated from the incumbent￿ s, industry pro￿t is higher with
di⁄erentiated duopoly than with a single product monopoly, and there is entry in equilibrium.
11Reinganum (1983, 1989) shows that if the innovation￿ s arrival date instead is a stochastic function of ￿rms￿
R&D spending, as in patent races, the monopolist is more willing than an entrant to reduce its R&D and accept
a delay, due to its status quo pro￿t. This probabilistic replacement e⁄ect leads an incumbent monopolist to bid
less than an entrant when the innovation is drastic or, by continuity, close enough to drastic. Heuristically, the






0] where p is the probability that,
conditional on the incumbent not innovating, the entrant also will fail to innovate. Gilbert and Newbery￿ s analysis
corresponds to p = 0; secure monopoly corresponds to p = 1.
12Chen (2000) extends Gilbert and Newbery￿ s analysis by letting the entrant produce also the old product. He
shows that the incentive to add the new product is greater for the incumbent than the entrant if the products are
strategic complements and vice versa for strategic substitutes.








1. The e¢ ciency






0 is a stronger condition since the right-hand side
5monopoly price then exceeds the old marginal cost, so Bertrand competition would constrain
the innovator￿ s pro￿t below ￿m
1 . However, the opposing replacement e⁄ect ￿ absent under
deterministic preemption ￿ dilutes the incentive of a secure monopolist, leaving the di⁄erence
Gm ￿Gr = (￿m
1 ￿￿r
1)￿(￿m
0 ￿0) seemingly ambiguous. Arrow nevertheless is able to prove that
Gm < Gr through a di⁄erent argument: the value of a process innovation comes from reducing
the ￿rm￿ s marginal cost and this cost reduction applies to a smaller output under monopoly (see
also Tirole 1988). This argument, however, is speci￿c to process innovations.
3 The Model
The market has an initial product, A. An innovation will bring a new product, B. The innovator
obtains exclusive rights over B. The marginal cost of producing either A or B is constant, c ￿ 0:
The products are imperfect substitutes. Denote the demand functions by qA = DA (pA;pB);






> 0; for i = A;B and i 6= j: (1)
When only A is available, its demand is qA = Dm
A (pA):
Let pm
A denote the price charged by a monopolist over product A alone; (pmm
A ;pmm
B ) denote the







prices charged under duopoly ￿only the incumbent ￿rm supplies product A and only a di⁄erent









exist and are unique.
The pro￿ts for product A under a single-product monopoly, for A and B under a two-product














































Product A Is Initially Monopolized
includes also ￿
d
0, the incumbent￿ s pro￿t under duopoly. Both conditions are driven by a monopolist￿ s superior
ability to coordinate industry decisions.
6If the monopoly producer of A; ￿rm 1, innovates by adding product B; it becomes the two-





If only an entrant, ￿rm 2, can add product B, then post innovation the market becomes a duopoly.
The entrant￿ s gain is
Gd = ￿d
B: (4)
Comparing Gm and Gd is relevant, for example, for the Regulation Scenario discussed in the
Introduction.14 The di⁄erence in incentives can be expressed as











A ) > 0 is the diversion e⁄ect on product A: only the initial monopolist internal-






is the coordination e⁄ect on product B: pro￿t from the new product will generally di⁄er be-
tween a two-product monopolist and an independent innovator, because only the monopolist can
coordinate the prices of the two goods to maximize its overall pro￿t.
Remark 1 (decomposition) The incentive to add product B is greater for a monopolist over good
A than for an entrant that would compete in ex post duopoly if and only if the coordination e⁄ect









Remark 2 The coordination e⁄ect on product B can be negative, ￿mm
B < ￿d
B.
The inequality in Remark 2 can arise if the new product is signi￿cantly weaker than (but
di⁄erentiated from) the old. Section 4 provides an example in the asymmetric Hotelling model.
However, ￿mm
B > ￿d
B is a necessary condition for a secure monopolist to have a greater incen-
tive than an entrant to add the new product, because only the monopolist experiences a pro￿t
diversion on the old product.
Product A Is Initially Perfectly Competitive










B, whose sign is ambiguous. By contrast, the
Introduction discussed Gilbert and Newbery￿ s (1982) case where a monopolist faces a deterministic threat of



















A if it fails to
innovate. For this reason G
mp ￿ G








B) > 0, the
￿e¢ ciency e⁄ect￿with a nondrastic product innovation.
7Instead of monopoly in A, suppose there are n ￿ 3 symmetric and homogeneous Bertrand
￿rms, each earning ￿c
A = 0. This corresponds to Arrow￿ s (1962) competition case except that
now the innovation brings a new product instead of a cost reduction on the old product. If any
￿rm adds product B, the market structure will entail perfect competition in A and monopoly in




(pB ￿ c)DB (c;pB) < ￿d
B: (6)
The inequality in (6) holds because, with three or more ￿rms in A, even if the innovator is one of
them, the equilibrium price in A will equal marginal cost c.15 This is lower than the price of A
when sold by a single ￿rm, the initial monopolist. Thus, the gain to an innovator is larger under
ex post duopoly than when A is competitive:
Gd = ￿d
B > ￿c
B = Gc: (7)
Comparing the innovation incentive under competition (Gc) to that under monopoly (Gm) is
relevant, for example, in the Merger scenario or Patent scenario discussed in the Introduction.
4 Asymmetric Hotelling Framework
To show that either the diversion e⁄ect or the coordination e⁄ect can dominate, we consider a
Hotelling setting but letting the products di⁄er not only in their locations but also in ￿quality￿ .
4.1 Ranking The Innovation Incentives
Assume a unit mass of consumers, each having a unit demand and uniformly distributed on a
Hotelling line [0;1]. When purchasing a unit of product A or product B, a consumer at location x
receives net surplus uA = vA￿tx￿pA and uB = vB￿t(1 ￿ x)￿pB; respectively, where x 2 [0;1],
with good A at x = 0 and good B at x = 1. If vA = vB; the setting is the standard Hotelling model
with pure horizontal product di⁄erentiation. Our formulation allows also quality di⁄erentiation:
if vB > vA; then product B0s quality is higher, in the sense that an equidistant consumer values
B more than A, and conversely if vB < vA. We maintain the following assumption:
Assumption 1. 1.1) vA ￿ c + 2t; 1.2) vA + vB > 2c + 3t; and 1.3) jvB ￿ vAj < 2t:
15With just two ￿rms in A, if one of them sells also B then it will choose to abandon A (unless the exit cost is
substantial) so as to induce the rival to raise price (Judd, 1985).
8Assumption 1.1) implies that a monopolist over just good A would cover the market and
would set pA = vA ￿ t; 1.2) implies that the market would also be covered under duopoly; and
1.3) implies that when both products are present, each will have a positive output under either
a two-good monopoly or under duopoly.16
If ￿rm 1 is alone in the market and sells only product A, the optimal monopoly price and
output are, respectively:
pm
A = vA ￿ t; qm
A = 1; (8)
and the monopoly pro￿t is
￿m
A = vA ￿ t ￿ c: (9)
Next, if ￿rm 1 adds product B, it becomes a monopolist over both goods. For prices pA
and pB; the consumer who is indi⁄erent between products A and B is located at xi, given by
vA ￿ pA ￿ txi = vB ￿ pB ￿ t(1 ￿ xi); or:
xi =
t + vA ￿ vB + pB ￿ pA
2t
(10)
Thus, the demand functions are qA = xi(pA;pB);qB = 1 ￿ xi(pA;pB). Pro￿t-maximization for
the monopolist implies that the indi⁄erent consumer will receive zero surplus:17
vA ￿ pA ￿ txi = 0:
Substituting for xi from (10) shows the relation between the highest prices that maintain market
coverage:
pB = vA ￿ pA ￿ t + vB: (11)
Since ￿mm = (pA ￿ c)xi + (pB ￿ c)(1 ￿ xi), where xi is given in (10) and pA and pB are re-
lated as shown in (11), we can express ￿mm as a function of only pA. The ￿rst-order condition
d￿mm=dpA = 0 here is su¢ cient for pro￿t maximization and implies the following equilibrium
prices and outputs for the two-product monopolist:
16Since vA is common to all consumers of good A, and similarly with vB, what matters for pro￿t functions and
equilibrium values are the di⁄erences between quality and unit cost of the two products, vA ￿cA and vB ￿cB. To
simplify notation, we assume equal costs, cA = cB = c; and analyze di⁄erences in quality. All our ensuing results
hold, however, if c is set to 0 in the relevant expressions and vA and vB are interpreted net of costs. Thus, our
results hold if the asymmetries are driven by cost, by quality, or some combination.
17Since all consumers purchase when only product A is o⁄ered by the monopolist, it must be true that all






















2: Adding B lets the ￿rm cover the market at p = v￿ t
2; thus raising price by t
2 since
the marginal consumer is now located at x = 1
2 instead of x = 1: If vB increases, the monopolist
diverts sales to B from A (￿qB = ￿￿qA > 0), while raising both prices. To see why the price of
A must rise, suppose that pA were held constant and pB were raised equally with vB to maintain
zero surplus for the original indi⁄erent consumer. Quantities would remain unchanged, but this
allocation is no longer optimal: since only the margin on B has risen, the monopolist gains by
shifting sales from A to B. To do so while holding the new indi⁄erent consumer at zero surplus,
it scales back the price increase on B and raises the price of A equally. (Thus, in equilibrium the
quality-adjusted price of B falls by ￿vB=4 and pA rises by ￿vB=4.)


















Next, again with a monopolist in A; if a di⁄erent ￿rm adds B, the market becomes a duopoly.
The pro￿t functions are ￿A = (pA ￿ c)xi(pA;pB);￿B = (pB ￿ c)(1 ￿ xi(pA;pB)); where xi is
given in (10) except that the relevant prices now are the duopoly prices pd
A, pd
B. These prices are
determined by the ￿rst-order conditions:
@￿A=@pA =
vA ￿ vB + pB ￿ pA + t
2t





￿vA + vB ￿ pB + pA + t
2t




The duopoly equilibrium prices are
pd








The corresponding equilibrium outputs are:
qd














It can be easily veri￿ed that all consumers will have positive surplus and will thus indeed purchase
10given vA + vB > 2c + 3t (Assumption 1.2).
Observe that if vB increases then pA falls under duopoly, whereas under joint monopoly
pA rises (compare (16) and (12)). Moreover, as vB increases, the gap between pB and pA
rises more slowly under monopoly than under duopoly: @ (pmm
B ￿ pmm







=@vB. Thus, qB increases faster at the expense of qA under monopoly than under
duopoly since, using (10), @qB=@vB = [1 ￿ @ (pB ￿ pA)=@vB]=2t.18 We summarize these obser-
vations in the following Remark.
Remark 3 Given the quality of the old good, vA, an increase in the quality of the new good, vB,
will cause: (i) the price of A to fall under duopoly but rise under monopoly; and (ii) the market
share of B to rise faster under monopoly.
Remark 3 illustrates sharply the coordination advantage in pricing of a two-product monopolist
over an entrant that sells the new good B and competes against a di⁄erent seller of A.
From Remark 1, the incentive to add product B is greater under monopoly than under duopoly








A ): Using (16) and (17), the equilibrium pro￿t
from product B under duopoly is
￿d
B =













[12t + 5(vB ￿ vA)](vB ￿ vA)
72t
:
Assumption 1.3), jvB ￿ vAj < 2t; implies [12t + 5(vB ￿ vA)] > 0: Thus,








A ) > 0 () vB > vA:
When the innovator of B instead faces perfect competition from good A (instead of ex post
duopoly), the equilibrium price and quantity of B are
pc
B = c +




vB ￿ vA + t
4t
; (19)
18This discussion further implies that when B is the stronger product, its market share will be larger under
monopoly than under duopoly (and smaller when B is weaker): using (10), qB ￿ qA = (vB ￿ vA) ￿ (pB ￿ pA) and
(pB ￿ pA) has the same sign as (vB ￿ vA) but is smaller in absolute value under monopoly. This market share
discrepancy is relevant for our later discussion of drastic innovations.




0 if t ￿ vA ￿ vB
(t￿vA+vB)2
8t if vA ￿ vB < t
; (20)
and












8 > 0 if vA ￿ vB < t
:
We have thus established our main result:
Proposition 1 Assume that the products and consumer preferences are described by a Hotelling
setting. (i) The incentive to add the new product B is greater under Monopoly than under the
Duopoly regime if and only if product B has higher quality: Gm > Gd () vB > vA: (ii) The
incentive to add the new product B is always greater under Monopoly than under Competition.
The monopoly versus duopoly ranking can be understood by starting with symmetry, vA = vB.
If a monopolist over A adds product B, it sets equal prices and continues serving the whole market,
but raises price by t=2, so its gain is Gm = t=2. If, instead, an entrant adds product B, its price
in the duopoly competition with the supplier of A is c+t, so its margin is t, but it only captures
1=2 the market. Its gain is Gd = ￿d
B = t=2, the same as for a monopolist.
Next, starting at vA = vB, consider increasing vB by a small amount ￿. From (12), a two-good
monopolist would raise pB by ￿3=4 and pA by ￿=4. Since each good initially has half the sales
and diversion from A to B is neutral when starting with equal margins, the ￿rst-order change
in pro￿t is just the average price increase, ￿=2. Under duopoly, using (16) and (17), pB would
only rise by ￿/3 and only to 1/2 the market, for a gain of ￿/6; in addition, sales of B expand
by ￿
6t and the initial margin is t, so the ￿rst-order increase in pro￿t is ￿=3. Thus, an increase in
the value of the new good B raises pro￿t by more when B is added by the monopolist than by
the entrant, showing that Gm > Gd if and only if vB > vA in the neighborhood of symmetric
products. Straightforward algebra shows that, in fact, @ (￿mm
A + ￿mm
B )=@vB > @￿d
B=@vB over the
entire relevant range, hence Gm = Gd at vB = vA implies Gm > Gd if and only if vB > vA.
Drastic Product Innovations and Weak Nondrastic Product Innovations
So far we have examined nondrastic product innovations ￿ the old product continues to
in￿ uence the innovator￿ s equilibrium pro￿t. In the Introduction, we noted that the innovation
incentive is sure to be lower for a secure monopolist than for a ￿rm initially earning zero pro￿t if
post innovation pro￿t would be the same in either case ￿ the unconstrained monopoly pro￿t from
the new product. This ex post equality requires the product innovation to be drastic starting from
12either market structure. The quali￿er ￿either￿is needed because, unlike a process innovation, a
given product innovation can be drastic under one market structure but not another.
Speci￿cally, in our Hotelling framework innovations are drastic for a broader range of para-
meter values under monopoly than when the innovator faces rivalry from the old good.19 The
same pattern occurs in Greenstein and Ramey (1998) with vertical product di⁄erentiation.20
Intuitively, a separate ￿rm would price the old product lower than would a joint monopolist
because only a monopolist internalizes the pro￿t diversion imposed on the new product. Thus,
the old product maintains a constraining in￿ uence when available to a rival ￿rm even in some
cases where a joint monopolist would shut it down.
At the other end of the spectrum, consider a product innovation that is nondrastic and
￿weak￿￿ a monopolist who sells both products will earn a much lower margin on the new than
on the old. In the Hotelling framework, a weak new product can yield less pro￿t to a joint
monopolist than to an entrant, ￿mm
B < ￿d
B (Remark 2). To see this possibility, observe that for
vB 2 (vA ￿ 3t; vA ￿ 2t) an entrant would add good B while a monopolist over A would not. (In
(17), vA ￿ 3t < vB implies qd
B > 0; in (12), vB < vA ￿ 2t implies qmm
B = 0.) By continuity, an
entrant￿ s pro￿t from B exceeds a monopolist￿ s also for some values vB > vA ￿2t, when B would
be added under either regime (thereby satisfying Assumption 1.3).21 The logic is the same as
for why some innovations are drastic under joint monopoly but not under rivalry. This time, the
new product is the weaker one and a joint monopolist sets prices to divert sales to the stronger
product more aggressively than would an entrant innovator selling only the weaker new product.
(Recall the discussion before Remark 3.)
This discussion suggests an interesting non-monotonicity in the magnitude of innovations for
19Under monopoly, q
mm
A = 0 if vB ￿ vA +2t, from (12); whereas under duopoly, q
d
A > 0 as long as vB < vA +3t,
from (17) (the same condition maintains q
c
A > 0, i.e., under the competition instead of duopoly regime). Moreover,
even when the old product has no sales, under duopoly or competition it still constrains the price of the new good
below the level that a joint monopolist would set. A joint monopolist that shuts down good A and covers the
market with B will set p
mm
B = vB ￿ t, to yield zero surplus for the consumer located furthest from B. When A is
available to a competitor, in order to still cover the market the seller of B must set its price under vB ￿ t, by an
amount vA ￿cA, the surplus available to the consumer located furthest from B if it bought A at cost. Thus, in our
Hotelling model a product innovation is never drastic under a rivalrous market structure, it can only be drastic
under monopoly.
20See their Proposition 1. (As an aside, the innovation can be drastic under rivalrous market structures in their
model, but this is not an inherent distinction between vertical and horizontal di⁄erentiation. It arises from their
assumption that the market is not covered, so the marginal consumer that buys the old, low-quality good gets
zero surplus. If, instead, the lowest type could get positive surplus from buying the old good at cost, then the
availability of the old good to competitors would constrain the price of the new good even if sales of the old good
were driven to zero.)




B if vB 2 (0.5, 1.1) and in this range the new
product would be added under either monopoly or duopoly.
13which a monopolist￿ s incentive to add the new product must be lower than an entrant￿ s. This
ranking occurs if the new product is su¢ ciently strong ￿ a drastic innovation ￿ or su¢ ciently
weak.22 The monopolist￿ s incentive can be higher than an entrant￿ s only in intermediate cases.
4.2 Welfare Comparison
Total Welfare
We have shown that when vB > vA; the incentive to introduce product B is greater for a
secure monopolist than for a would-be duopolist. Suppose now that adding product B entails
a ￿xed cost f: For certain values of f; product B will be introduced under monopoly, but not
otherwise. Can overall welfare, therefore, be higher under monopoly?
The answer is not immediate, since part of the monopolist￿ s gain from adding the new prod-
uct comes at the expense of consumers, as we show later. However, the following argument
demonstrates that total welfare can be higher under monopoly.
Let S denote consumer surplus and W denote total welfare. If product B is not introduced,
the market is served fully with product A: If product B is introduced by the monopolist, the
change in total welfare is
￿W = Gm ￿ f + ￿S; (21)
since Gm denotes the monopolist￿ s gain before subtracting ￿xed costs. In order for the product
to be introduced under monopoly but not under duopoly, f must lie in the range
Gd = ￿d
B ￿ f < ￿mm
A + ￿mm
B ￿ ￿m
A = Gm: (22)
Suppose ￿d
B = f: Then (21) becomes
￿W = Gm ￿ Gd + ￿S: (23)
22The reasoning, however, is di⁄erent in the two cases. For a drastic innovation, post innovation pro￿t is equal
under both regimes, so it immediately follows that the monopolist￿ s incentive to add the new product is lower
because only it earns pro￿t without the innovation. For a nondrastic innovation, this argument cannot be used
since the monopolist￿ s total post innovation pro￿t is higher than an entrant￿ s. However, the di⁄erence in incentives
can be decomposed into the coordination e⁄ect on the new product and the diversion e⁄ect on the old (Remark 1).
Since diversion arises only for the monopolist, a negative coordination e⁄ect, i.e., the monopolist earning less than
an entrant on the new good alone, is su¢ cient to make the monopolist￿ s incentive again lower than an entrant￿ s.
For intermediate innovations, the coordination e⁄ect will be positive and must be weighed against the diversion
e⁄ect to determine the ranking of incentives.
14Recall that if vB > vA then Gm ￿ Gd > 0: Furthermore, notice that
Gm ￿ Gd =
[12t + 5(vB ￿ vA)](vB ￿ vA)
72t
increases in (vB ￿ vA): As (vB ￿ vA) increases towards its limit of 2t (Assumption 1.3)), good B￿ s
share of the market increases towards 1 and A￿ s share falls towards 0. Thus, consumer surplus
under two-good monopoly becomes arbitrarily close to the level under single-good monopoly:
Product B instead of A now serves (almost) all the market, and the monopolist fully appropriates
the rise in product quality vB ￿vA through an increase in price. The losing consumers are those
who still buy A, but their mass can be made arbitrarily small. Therefore, as vB ￿ vA increases
towards 2t; ￿S remains negative but becomes arbitrarily small, while Gm ￿ Gd is positive and
increases, showing that in (23) ￿W > 0:
We therefore have:
Proposition 2 In the Hotelling setting, given the parameters t and c, there exist parameter
values f, vA, vB, with vB > vA; such that product B is added under monopoly but not under
duopoly and total welfare is higher under monopoly.
Consumer Welfare
In the above Hotelling setting, the introduction of the new product by the monopolist nec-
essarily harms consumers. To see this, observe that with only product A, pm
A = vA ￿ t so the
average consumer, located at x = 1=2, earns surplus of t=2. With both products o⁄ered, the
indi⁄erent consumer is located at ^ x =
vA￿vB+pB￿pA+t
2t 2 (0;1). The monopoly prices (pmm
A ;pmm
B )
are set to leave this consumer zero surplus:
vA ￿ pmm
A ￿ t^ x = 0 = vB ￿ pmm
B ￿ t(1 ￿ ^ x):
Consumers located at x < ^ x continue buying good A. The average such consumer is located
at ^ x/2 and earns surplus t^ x=2, less than the surplus t=2 earned by the average consumer when
only good A was supplied. Consumers located at x > ^ x switch to buying product B. The average
such consumer is located at (^ x + 1)=2 and therefore earns surplus
vB ￿ pmm
B ￿ t[1 ￿ (1 + ^ x)=2] = t(1 ￿ ^ x)=2:
When only product A was available, that same consumer earned equal surplus:
vA ￿ pm
A ￿ t(^ x + 1)=2 = t ￿ t(^ x + 1)=2 = t(1 ￿ ^ x)=2:
15Thus, consumers that switched from product A to B in total earn the same surplus, while those
who continue buying A have lost.
The reduction of consumer welfare when the monopolist adds a new product, however, need
not arise in other settings. In Appendix A, we present an extension of the Hotelling model
where the monopolist￿ s product innovation can bene￿t consumers. Thus, consumer welfare and
overall welfare can both be higher under monopoly than under more rivalrous regimes, when the
incentive to innovate is higher under monopoly.
5 Horizontal versus Vertical Product Di⁄erentiation
Instead of our Hotelling framework, Greenstein and Ramey (1998, ￿GR￿ ) analyze vertical prod-
uct di⁄erentiation (Shaked and Sutton, 1983; Tirole, 1988). Also, under duopoly they assume
Cournot competition while we assume Bertrand. To isolate the role of the demand systems we
compare the ranking of incentives in the two models for common regimes: monopoly in both
goods (mm) versus competition in the old good and monopoly in the new (regime c, GR￿ s
￿dominant-fringe structure￿ ). In our model, the incentive to add the new product is greater
under monopoly than under competition (Proposition 1) and the incentive gap grows with the
advantage of the new product. GR ￿nd that for any innovation that is non-drastic under both
regimes, the incentives under monopoly or competition are equal, Gm = Gc (Proposition 2(a)).23
Why is vertical di⁄erentiation less favorable than horizontal di⁄erentiation for a monopolist￿ s
incentive to add a product? To trace the fundamental di⁄erence we ￿rst review the intuition for
GR￿ s results and then brie￿ y revisit the Hotelling framework.
5.1 Vertical Di⁄erentiation
Greenstein and Ramey consider a continuum of consumers whose type ! indicates their willingness
to pay. Each consumer demands at most one unit of either the old or new good, and the
gross surplus from buying is fO (!) or vfN (!). The parameter v > 0 indexes the innovation￿ s
magnitude. All types value the new good more than the old, vfN (!) > fO (!) for all relevant
v; gross surplus from either good increases with type, as does the premium o⁄ered for the new
good: vf0
N (!) > 0; f0
O (!) > 0, and vf0
N (!) > f0
O (!). At prices pN > pO such that both goods
23We shall use our notation to denote the various regimes also when discussing their paper. For the reader￿ s
convenience, we recap here the names of our regimes, and note in parentheses their counterparts in GR: monopoly
over only the old good, indexed by superscript ￿m￿ (Old Monopoly, OM); Monopoly over both goods, ￿mm￿
(Joint Monopoly, M); Competition in the old good and monopoly in the new, ￿c￿(Dominant-Fringe Structure, C);
Duopoly ex post, with a di⁄erent supplier of each good, ￿d￿(D).
16have positive sales there are two marginal types of consumers. Type !O is indi⁄erent between
buying the old good or none: fO (!O) ￿ pO = 0. Type !N > !O is indi⁄erent between the two
goods: fO (!N) ￿ pO = vfN (!N) ￿ pN: Consumer types between !O and !N buy the old good,
generating sales qO; those above !N buy the new good, generating sales qN.24
Facts F1-F3 below help understand the equilibrium choices of a two-good monopolist whenever
both goods are sold (i.e., when !N > !O, so the innovation is nondrastic). F1: Total quantity
sold (q = qO+qN) depends only on the price of the low quality good since pO alone determines the
identity of type !O (equivalently, pO depends only on total quantity q). F2: An equal increase in
both prices that leaves qO > 0 does not a⁄ect sales of the new good, qN: since !N is unchanged
and this consumer retains positive surplus (!N > !O =) fO (!N) ￿ pO > f (!O) ￿ pO = 0), all
types ! ￿ !N will continue to buy the new good. F3: Rearranging the condition determining
!N as pN ￿ pO = vfN (!N) ￿ fO (!N) shows that the price premium that can be collected for
the new good is independent of the quantity of the old ￿ it depends only on the identity of type
!N and, hence, only on the quantity of the new good qN.
GR￿ s Proposition 2(a) ￿ ows directly from their Lemma, which establishes two properties: (a)




O; and (b) the quantity of the new good sold by a two-good monopolist
equals that sold by a monopolist that faces perfect competition from the old good, qmm
N = qc
N.
We now explain the intuition for these results and their implication.
Start with part (a). For a two-good monopolist, pro￿t is ￿mm = (pO ￿ cO)qO+(pN ￿ cN)qN:
Using q = qO+qN pro￿t can be decomposed as (pO ￿ cO)q+[pN ￿ pO ￿ (cN ￿ cO)]qN: the pro￿t
that would be earned if a total quantity q of the low-quality good were sold at its price pO plus
the premium earned by actually diverting the quantity qN from the old good to the new. Term
(pO ￿ cO)q depends only on total quantity q (since pO depends only on q, by F1), while the
other term depends only on qN (since the premium pN ￿ pO depends only on qN, by F3), so the
optimal choice of q is separable from that of qN (i.e., of the optimal mix between the two goods).
A monopolist that only sold the old good would choose q to maximize expression (pO ￿ cO)q.
Therefore, the total quantity chosen will be the same in both cases: qmm = qm
O.25 Since total
quantity depends only on the price of that low-quality good, its price also must remain unchanged,
24GR make the usual simplifying assumptions, that ! is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and the mass of consumers
is one, but these are not essential for the ensuing results. With those assumptions, the quantities are qN = 1￿!N,
qO = !N ￿ !O.
25The following provides additional intuition. The output q
m
O satis￿es the standard marginal condition: the loss
from a small output reduction, (p
m




O) multiplied by the remaining
output q
m
O. A two-good monopolist faces an identical tradeo⁄ when reducing total quantity: it loses the margin
on the old good, pO ￿ cO, but raises price by f
0
O (!O) on both the old good￿ s quantity qO and on qN, because






O.26 Thus, by the earlier decomposition, the pro￿t of a two-good monopolist equals the
pro￿t earned by a monopolist that sold only the old good, (pmm
O ￿ cO)qm
O, plus the premium from
adding the new good, discussed next.
Now consider part (b), why qmm
N = qc
N. The condition determining !N, hence qN, yields the
inverse demand function PN (qNjpO) = vfN (!N)￿(fO (!N) ￿ pO): the price that can be charged
for the new good for a given quantity equals the gross surplus to the corresponding type !N from
the new good minus the net surplus it can get by buying the old good. Note that PN (qNjpmm
O ) =
PN (qNjcO)+(pmm
O ￿ cO). When a monopolist over the new good faces perfect competition from
the old (pO = cO) it chooses qN to maximize the pro￿t function [PN (qNjcO) ￿ cN]qN. Denote
the equilibrium quantity, price, and pro￿t by qc
N, pc




With a two-good monopolist, we saw that qN is chosen to maximize the ￿premium￿term [pN ￿
pmm
O ￿(cN ￿ cO)]qN or [PN (qNjpmm
O ) ￿ (pmm
O ￿ cO) ￿ cN]qN; which is the same as [PN (qNjcO)￿
cN]qN, the pro￿t function of a monopolist over the new good that faces competition from the
old. Therefore, the optimal qN must be identical in both cases, qmm
N = qc
N.27 The extra pro￿t





Using both parts of the Lemma, the pro￿t of a two-good monopolist is ￿mm = ￿m
O +￿c
N. The
gain from adding the new good therefore is the same under either regime: Gm = ￿mm ￿ ￿m
O =
￿c
N = Gc. By contrast, in the asymmetric Hotelling model our Proposition 1 showed that the
gain from adding the new product is greater under monopoly than under competition (and also
greater than under duopoly if the new product￿ s quality is higher, vB > vA).
5.2 Comparing Vertical and Horizontal Di⁄erentiation
The key di⁄erence between vertical and horizontal di⁄erentiation is the identity of the marginal
types of consumers and what this implies for pricing by a two-product monopolist.28 With vertical
di⁄erentiation, there are two marginal types: type !N who is indi⁄erent between the two goods
and gets positive surplus; and a lower type !O who is indi⁄erent between the low-quality old good
26In the Hotelling model, when the monopolist adds a new good recall that total quantity also stays unchanged
but the price of the old good rises, a point we shall revisit.
27Intuitively, when moving from regime ￿c￿(competition in the old good and monopoly in the new) to regime
￿mm￿(joint monopoly), two e⁄ects on the marginal pro￿tability of expanding qN exactly cancel: (i) the price of
the old good rises by p
mm
O ￿cO, as does the price of the new good for any qN, so the per-unit gain from expanding
qN increases by p
mm
O ￿ cO; but (ii) each unit of the new good diverts one unit of the old, which reduces pro￿t of
the two-good monopolist by p
mm
O ￿ cO. Thus, the optimal quantity of the new good stays q
c
N.
28In both settings, when a monopolist adds the new product total quantity stays unchanged, so this is not the
source of divergence.
18and not buying at all, hence gets zero surplus. The consumers who choose the new good are the
relatively higher types, not those who are on the margin of buying the old good versus dropping
out. This structure implies a division of labor between a monopolist￿ s two prices: the price of
the low-quality good is set to determine total sales, and the price of the new good determines
the mix of sales. Under horizontal di⁄erentiation, the consumers attracted to the new good are
those who get relatively low surplus from the old. This permits a joint monopolist more latitude
in raising the price of the old good to divert sales to the new without causing some consumers to
drop out of the market.
To illustrate the di⁄erential pricing latitude we analyze for the Hotelling model the same
comparisons as in parts a) and b) of GR￿ s Lemma. First consider the price adjustments when
a monopolist over the old good adds the new good (moving from regime m to mm ￿ part a)
of GR￿ s Lemma). Under vertical di⁄erentiation, the price of the old, low-quality good remains
unchanged to avoid reducing total sales. Under horizontal di⁄erentiation, adding the new product
B lets the monopolist raise the price of A while maintaining market coverage. When only good
A is o⁄ered, its price is set to yield zero surplus for the consumer located furthest away ￿ which
is where good B is added. Thus, the previously marginal consumer and consumers close to it will
switch to the new good. The new consumer who is indi⁄erent between the two goods will be less
distant from A than was the original marginal consumer of A and, hence, would enjoy positive
surplus if the price of A were unchanged after good B is added. The monopolist therefore raises
the price of the old good without losing aggregate sales: all consumers who stop buying the old
good will divert to the new good.29
Next, consider a monopolist over the new good acquiring control of the initially competitive
old good (moving from regime c to mm ￿ part b) of GR￿ s Lemma). With vertical di⁄erentiation,
sales of the new good stay unchanged because prices of both goods are raised equally. Under
horizontal di⁄erentiation, sales of the new good will increase (qmm
B > qc
B) because the monopolist
will raise price by more for the old good than for the new. To see why, start with the equilibrium
quantities when B is monopolized but A is competitive, and consider raising both prices equally
until the indi⁄erent consumer (xi) gets zero surplus, thus maintaining market coverage and the
initial quantities of both goods. At this price pro￿le, good B remains under-supplied relative to
A from the standpoint of the joint monopolist￿ s pro￿t, since the ratio qc
B=qc
A emerged when the
monopolist controlled only the price of B. A joint monopolist therefore will shift sales from A to
B by raising the price of A and cutting the price of B equally (keeping the indi⁄erent consumer
29And as the quality of the new good v
B rises, the monopolist raises the price also of the old good while
maintaining market coverage. Under vertical di⁄erentiation, the price of the low-quality good remains unchanged
as the quality of the new one, v, increases so long as the old good still retains any positive sales.
19at zero surplus) without losing aggregate sales.30 By contrast, under vertical di⁄erentiation a rise
in the price of the old, low-quality good matched by an equal cut in the price of the new good
would reduce total sales ￿because the old good competes at two margins: with the new one and
with outside goods.
The above models involve discrete choices by heterogeneous consumers. We have also analyzed
the familiar model of a representative consumer with quadratic utility function over, and elastic
demands for, the two di⁄erentiated products (see Appendix B). Interestingly, the ranking of
incentives to add the new product is the same as in GR, Gm = Gc < Gd. Despite the di⁄erent
preference structures and resulting demand systems, the representative consumer case shares
two features with vertical ￿ but not horizontal ￿ di⁄erentiation. When a monopolist over the
old good adds the new product, (i) an increase in the price of the old good would reduce total
sales, and in equilibrium that price is left unchanged; and (ii) sales of the new good under joint
monopoly are the same as in the case where the old good is competitive.
This discussion suggests the following principle. When comparing the incentive of a monopo-
list to add a second product relative to the incentive of a more rivalrous ￿rm, a key factor is the
extent to which the monopolist can divert sales to the new product as opposed to leaking sales
to outside goods if it raises the price of its old product.
6 Conclusion
In contrast to Arrow￿ s pioneering analysis of a process innovation, this paper showed in a Hotelling
framework that the incentive to invest in a nondrastic product innovation can be higher under a
secure monopoly than under market structures that feature product market rivalry.
Compared to a ￿rm that earns lower pro￿t initially (e.g., an entrant or a Bertrand competitor)
and will face rivalry from independent sellers of the old product post innovation, the monopolist￿ s
incentive can be decomposed into two opposing e⁄ects. The monopolist loses more pro￿t on the
old product (diversion e⁄ect) but may earn more pro￿t on the new one (coordination e⁄ect)
because it prices the old product in a way that internalizes the e⁄ect on the new one.
The relative strength of these opposing diversion and coordination e⁄ects depends on the
particular properties of demand. Collectively, our ￿ndings and the results of Greenstein and
30A small cut in the price of B alone would leave pro￿t unchanged, because q
c
B was the monopolist￿ s interior
optimum choice when it only controlled B, and the tradeo⁄ from cutting the price of B remains unchanged if the
monopolist acquires A and raises both prices equally. (The margin on B has risen, but the opportunity cost of
selling B has risen equally since the monopolist now internalizes diversion from A, the same logic as in part b of
GR￿ s Lemma.) However, a price reduction on B permits an increase in the price of A while maintaining market
coverage, and this combination of price changes will raise pro￿t.
20Ramey (1998) suggest that the ranking of incentives to invest in product innovations across
market structures will be quite sensitive to the nature of product di⁄erentiation.
21Appendix A: Extended Hotelling Model
We extend the Hotelling model in Section 3 so that the producer of the new product (B) will
have monopoly power on an additional segment of consumers. Speci￿cally, in addition to the unit
mass of consumers on the Hotelling line, we assume that there is also a mass of ￿ ￿ 0 consumers
who only like the new product B, each having a unit demand and valuing product B at v; where
v is the realization of a random variable with cdf F (v) on support [v; ￿ v]:31 Notice that if ￿ = 0;
the model reduces to the Hotelling model. We assume that the producer of B is able to charge
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For convenience, we assume:
Assumption 2. pm




[1 ￿ F (p)]dp ￿ t
4:
Since the price to the ￿ consumers is set separately, the presence of these consumers will
increase the pro￿t from product B by ￿m
￿ ; regardless of which ￿rm adds (innovates) B; and will
not a⁄ect the pro￿ts from the Hotelling line: Thus, the pro￿t from product A by a single product
monopolist is still ￿m










Since the gains from innovation are now ^ Gm = Gm+ ￿m
￿ and ^ Gd = Gd + ￿m
￿ ; we again have
^ Gm > ^ Gd if and only if vB > vA.
While the presence of ￿ consumers has no e⁄ect on the comparison of innovation incentives,
it increases the consumer surplus brought about by product B:









31We could alternatively assume that the ￿ consumers each have a downward sloping demand ￿D(p):
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[1 ￿ F (p)]dp:
We thus have:
Smm ￿ Sm =




















[1 ￿ F (p)]dp:
Note that for ￿ = 0; since jvB ￿ vAj < 2t from Assumption 1.3), Smm ￿ Sm < 0; showing
that consumer surplus in our original Hotelling model falls when a monopolist adds the second
product. However, Smm ￿ Sm increases in ￿; and, Smm ￿ Sm > 0 if ￿ = 1. Therefore:










Then there exists some ^ ￿ 2 (0;1) such that aggregate consumer surplus is higher (lower) under
Monopoly than under the Duopoly regime if ￿ > ^ ￿ (￿ < ^ ￿):
Thus consumer welfare can be higher under monopoly due to the product innovation that
would not be pro￿table if the innovator had to face price competition from the old good.
23Appendix B: Representative Consumer with Quadratic Utility
Assume that the inverse demand system is given by :
pA = 1 ￿ qA ￿ ￿qB; pB = a ￿ bqB ￿ ￿qA; (24)
where a denotes the demand advantage of the new good, and we assume a ￿ ￿ > 0; and b > a￿
so that a multiproduct monopolist would produce positive quantities for both products: This
demand system can be generated by a representative consumer with the familiar quasi-linear
utility function, that is additive in income and in a quadratic sub-utility function de￿ned over
the di⁄erentiated goods (Vives 1999):









We normalize constant marginal cost c = 0: The direct demand system is
qA =
b ￿ a￿ ￿ bpA + ￿pB
b ￿ ￿2 ; qB =
a ￿ ￿ ￿ pB + ￿pA
b ￿ ￿2 : (25)
First, for a monopolist producing only product A; the demand for A is
Dm (pA) = 1 ￿ pA:














Next, if ￿rm 1 innovates B, it becomes a monopolist in both A and B. It thus chooses pA and
pB to maximize
pA
b ￿ a￿ ￿ bpA + ￿pB
b ￿ ￿2 + pB
a ￿ ￿ ￿ pB + ￿pA




























Next, if the competitor innovates B, the market becomes a duopoly. The pro￿ts of ￿rms A and
24B, respectively, are
pA
b ￿ a￿ ￿ bpA + ￿pB
b ￿ ￿2 ; pB
a ￿ ￿ ￿ pB + ￿pA
b ￿ ￿2 :
We obtain the equilibrium prices and outputs as
pd
A =
2b ￿ a￿ ￿ ￿2
4b ￿ ￿2 ; pd
B =
2ab ￿ b￿ ￿ a￿2




2b ￿ a￿ ￿ ￿2￿
b




2ab ￿ b￿ ￿ a￿2￿
(4b ￿ ￿2)(b ￿ ￿2)
:




2b ￿ a￿ ￿ ￿2￿2 b
(4b ￿ ￿2)




2ab ￿ b￿ ￿ a￿2￿2
(4b ￿ ￿2)
2 (b ￿ ￿2)
: (28)
Finally, if the production of A is competitive, then pc
A = MC = 0; and
qB =
a ￿ ￿ ￿ pB + ￿pA
b ￿ ￿2 =
a ￿ ￿ ￿ pB
b ￿ ￿2 :



























2b ￿ a￿ ￿ ￿2￿￿
6b￿ ￿ 8ab ￿ ￿3 + 3a￿2￿
￿
4(4b ￿ ￿2)
2 (b ￿ ￿2)
:
Since a ￿ ￿ and b > a￿ ￿ ￿2 by assumption, we have
2b ￿ a￿ ￿ ￿2 = b ￿ a￿ + b ￿ ￿2 > 0;
and
6b￿ ￿ 8ab ￿ ￿3 + 3a￿2 = b(6￿ ￿ 8a) + ￿2 (3a ￿ ￿) < 0;
25and hence Gm ￿ Gd < 0: On the other hand,




















We have thus established:
Proposition 4 If the demand system is given by (24), then Gd > Gm = Gc:
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